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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 90-985
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JAYNE BRAY, et al., PETITIONERS v. ALEXANDRIA
WOMEN'S HEALTH CLINIC et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit
[January 13, 1993]

  Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
  This case presents the question whether the first clause
of Rev. Stat. 1980, 42 U. S. C. 1985(3)-the surviving
version of 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871-provides a
federal cause of action against persons obstructing access
to abortion clinics.  Respondents are clinics that perform
abortions, and organizations that support legalized
abortion and that have members who may wish to use
abortion clinics.  Petitioners are Operation Rescue, an
unincorporated association whose members oppose
abortion, and six individuals.  Among its activities,
Operation Rescue organizes antiabortion demonstrations
in which participants trespass on, and obstruct general
access to, the premises of abortion clinics.  The individual
petitioners organize and coordinate these demonstrations.
  Respondents sued to enjoin petitioners from conducting
demonstrations at abortion clinics in the Washington,
D. C., metropolitan area.  Following an expedited trial,
the District Court ruled that petitioners had violated
1985(3) by conspiring to deprive women seeking abor-
tions of their right to interstate travel.  The court also
ruled for respondents on their pendent state-law claims
of trespass and public nuisance.  As relief on these three
claims, the court enjoined petitioners from trespassing on,
or obstructing access to, abortion clinics in specified
Virginia counties and cities in the Washington, D. C.,
metropolitan area.  National Organization for Women v.
Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (ED Va. 1989).
Based on its 1985(3) ruling and pursuant to 42 U. S. C.
1988, the court also ordered petitioners to pay respon-
dents $27,687.55 in attorney's fees and costs.
  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed,
National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue,
914 F. 2d 582 (CA4 1990), and we granted certiorari, 498
U. S. ___ (1991).  The case was argued in the October
1991 Term, and pursuant to our direction, see 504 U. S.
___ (1992), was reargued in the current Term.

                            I
  Our precedents establish that in order to prove a
private conspiracy in violation of the first clause of
1985(3), a plaintiff must show, inter alia, (1) that
-some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspirators'
action,- Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 102 (1971),
and (2) that the conspiracy -aimed at interfering with
rights- that are -protected against private, as well as
official, encroachment,- Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U. S. 825,
833 (1983).  We think neither showing has been made in
the present case.
                            A
  In Griffin this Court held, reversing a 20-year-old
precedent, see Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651 (1951),
that 1985(3) reaches not only conspiracies under color of
state law, but also purely private conspiracies.  In finding
that the text required that expanded scope, however, we
recognized the -constitutional shoals that would lie in the
path of interpreting 1985(3) as a general federal tort
law.-  Griffin, 403 U. S., at 102.  That was to be avoided,
we said, -by requiring, as an element of the cause of
action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation
stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment,-
ibid.-citing specifically Representative Shellabarger's
statement that the law was restricted -`to the prevention
of deprivations which shall attack the equality of rights
of American citizens; that any violation of the right, the
animus and effect of which is to strike down the citizen,
to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as
contrasted with his and other citizens' rights, shall be
within the scope of the remedies . . . .'-  Id., at 100
(emphasis in original), quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess., App. 478 (1871).  We said that -[t]he language
[of 1985(3)] requiring intent to deprive of equal protec-
tion, or equal privileges and immunities, means that
there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action.-  403 U. S., at 102 (emphasis in
original).
  We have not yet had occasion to resolve the -perhaps-;
only in Griffin itself have we addressed and upheld a
claim under 1985(3), and that case involved race
discrimination.  Respondents assert that there qualifies
alongside race discrimination, as an -otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus- covered by the
1871 law, opposition to abortion.  Neither common sense
nor our precedents support this.
  To begin with, we reject the apparent conclusion of the
District Court (which respondents make no effort to
defend) that opposition to abortion constitutes discrimina-
tion against the -class- of -women seeking abortion.-
Whatever may be the precise meaning of a -class- for
purposes of Griffin's speculative extension of 1985(3)
beyond race, the term unquestionably connotes something
more than a group of individuals who share a desire to
engage in conduct that the 1985(3) defendant disfavors.
Otherwise, innumerable tort plaintiffs would be able to
assert causes of action under 1985(3) by simply defining
the aggrieved class as those seeking to engage in the
activity the defendant has interfered with.  This
definitional ploy would convert the statute into the
-general federal tort law- it was the very purpose of the
animus requirement to avoid.  Ibid.  As Justice
Blackmun has cogently put it, the class -cannot be
defined simply as the group of victims of the tortious
action.-  Carpenters, supra, at 850 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).  -Women seeking abortion- is not a qualifying
class.
  Respondents' contention, however, is that the alleged
class-based discrimination is directed not at -women
seeking abortion- but at women in general.  We find it
unnecessary to decide whether that is a qualifying class
under 1985(3), since the claim that petitioners' opposi-
tion to abortion reflects an animus against women in
general must be rejected.  We do not think that the
-animus- requirement can be met only by maliciously
motivated, as opposed to assertedly benign (though objec-
tively invidious), discrimination against women.  It does
demand, however, at least a purpose that focuses upon
women by reason of their sex-for example (to use an
illustration of assertedly benign discrimination), the
purpose of -saving- women because they are women from
a combative, aggressive profession such as the practice of
law.  The record in this case does not indicate that
petitioners' demonstrations are motivated by a purpose
(malevolent or benign) directed specifically at women as
a class; to the contrary, the District Court found that
petitioners define their -rescues- not with reference to
women, but as physical intervention -`between abortion-
ists and the innocent victims,'- and that -all [petitioners]
share a deep commitment to the goals of stopping the
practice of abortion and reversing its legalization.-  726
F. Supp., at 1488.  Given this record, respondents'
contention that a class-based animus has been established
can be true only if one of two suggested propositions is
true: (1) that opposition to abortion can reasonably be
presumed to reflect a sex-based intent, or (2) that intent
is irrelevant, and a class-based animus can be determined
solely by effect.  Neither proposition is supportable.
    As to the first: Some activities may be such an
irrational object of disfavor that, if they are targeted, and
if they also happen to be engaged in exclusively or
predominantly by a particular class of people, an intent
to disfavor that class can readily be presumed.  A tax on
wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.  But opposition to
voluntary abortion cannot possibly be considered such an
irrational surrogate for opposition to (or paternalism
towards) women.  Whatever one thinks of abortion, it
cannot be denied that there are common and respectable
reasons for opposing it, other than hatred of or condescen-
sion toward (or indeed any view at all concerning) women
as a class-as is evident from the fact that men and
women are on both sides of the issue, just as men and
women are on both sides of petitioners' unlawful demon-
strations.  See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U. S. ___, ___ (1992).
  Respondents' case comes down, then, to the proposition
that intent is legally irrelevant; that since voluntary
abortion is an activity engaged in only by women, to
disfavor it is ipso facto to discriminate invidiously against
women as a class.  Our cases do not support that proposi-
tion.  In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484 (1974), we
rejected the claim that a state disability insurance system
that denied coverage to certain disabilities resulting from
pregnancy discriminated on the basis of sex in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  -While it is true,- we said, -that only women can
become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative
classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classifi-
cation.-  Id., at 496, n. 20.  We reached a similar
conclusion in Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U. S. 256 (1979), sustaining against an Equal
Protection Clause challenge a Massachusetts law giving
employment preference to military veterans, a class which
in Massachusetts was over 98% male, id., at 270.
-`Discriminatory purpose,'- we said, -implies more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.
It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaf-
firmed a particular course of action at least in part
`because of,' not merely `in spite of,' its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group.-  Id., at 279 (citation omit-
ted).  The same principle applies to the -class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus- requirement of
1985(3).  Moreover, two of our cases deal specifically
with the disfavoring of abortion, and establish conclu-
sively that it is not ipso facto sex discrimination.  In
Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464 (1977), and Harris v. McRae,
448 U. S. 297 (1980), we held that the constitutional test
applicable to government abortion-funding restrictions is
not the heightened-scrutiny standard that our cases
demand for sex-based discrimination, see Craig v. Boren,
429 U. S. 190, 197-199 (1976), but the ordinary ration-
ality standard.  See Maher, supra, at 470-471, 478;
Harris, supra, at 322-324.
  The nature of the -invidiously discriminatory animus-
Griffin had in mind is suggested both by the language
used in that phrase (-invidious . . . [t]ending to excite
odium, ill will, or envy; likely to give offense; esp.,
unjustly and irritatingly discriminating,- Webster's Second
International Dictionary 1306 (1954)) and by the company
in which the phrase is found (-there must be some racial,
or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discrimina-
tory animus,- Griffin, 403 U.S., at 102 (emphasis added)).
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the goal of prevent-
ing abortion, that goal in itself (apart from the use of
unlawful means to achieve it, which is not relevant to our
discussion of animus) does not remotely qualify for such
harsh description, and for such derogatory association
with racism.  To the contrary, we have said that -a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion- is proper and
reasonable enough to be implemented by the allocation of
public funds, see Maher, supra, at 474, and Congress
itself has, with our approval, discriminated against
abortion in its provision of financial support for medical
procedures, see Harris, supra, at 325.  This is not the
stuff out of which a 1985(3) -invidiously discriminatory
animus- is created.
                            B
  Respondents' federal claim fails for a second, indepen-
dent reason: A 1985(3) private conspiracy -for the
purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges
and immunities under the laws,- requires an intent to
deprive persons of a right guaranteed against private

impairment.  See Carpenters, 463 U. S., at 833.  No
intent to deprive of such a right was established here.
  Respondents, like the courts below, rely upon the right
to interstate travel-which we have held to be, in at least
some contexts, a right constitutionally protected against
private interference.  See Griffin, supra, at 105-106.  But
all that respondents can point to by way of connecting
petitioners' actions with that particular right is the
District Court's finding that -[s]ubstantial numbers of
women seeking the services of [abortion] clinics in the
Washington Metropolitan area travel interstate to reach
the clinics.-  726 F. Supp., at 1489.  That is not enough.
As we said in a case involving 18 U. S. C. 241, the
criminal counterpart of 1985(3):
-[A] conspiracy to rob an interstate traveler would
not, of itself, violate 241.  But if the predominant
purpose of the conspiracy is to impede or prevent the
exercise of the right of interstate travel, or to oppress
a person because of his exercise of that right, then
. . . the conspiracy becomes a proper object of the
federal law under which the indictment in this case
was brought.-  United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745,
760 (1966).
Our discussion in Carpenters makes clear that it does not
suffice for application of 1985(3) that a protected right
be incidentally affected.  A conspiracy is not -for the
purpose- of denying equal protection simply because it
has an effect upon a protected right.  The right must be
-aimed at,- 463 U. S., at 833 (emphasis added); its
impairment must be a conscious objective of the enter-
prise.  Just as the -invidiously discriminatory animus-
requirement, discussed above, requires that the defendant
have taken his action -at least in part `because of,' not
merely `in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifi-
able group,-  Feeney, 442 U. S., at 279, so also the
-intent to deprive of a right- requirement demands that
the defendant do more than merely be aware of a
deprivation of right that he causes, and more than merely
accept it; he must act at least in part for the very
purpose of producing it.  That was not shown to be the
case here, and is on its face implausible.  Petitioners
oppose abortion, and it is irrelevant to their opposition
whether the abortion is performed after interstate travel.
  Respondents have failed to show a conspiracy to violate
the right of interstate travel for yet another reason:
petitioners' proposed demonstrations would not implicate
that right.  The federal guarantee of interstate travel
does not transform state-law torts into federal offenses
when they are intentionally committed against interstate
travelers.  Rather, it protects interstate travelers against
two sets of burdens: -the erection of actual barriers to
interstate movement- and -being treated differently- from
intrastate travelers.  Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 60,
n. 6 (1982).  See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1868)
(Art. IV, 2 -inhibits discriminating legislation against
[citizens of other States and] gives them the right of free
ingress into other States, and egress from them-); Toomer
v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 395 (1948) (Art. IV, 2 -in-
sure[s] to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B
the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy-).
As far as appears from this record, the only -actual
barriers to movement- that would have resulted from
Petitioners' proposed demonstrations would have been in
the immediate vicinity of the abortion clinics, restricting
movement from one portion of the Commonwealth of
Virginia to another.  Such a purely intrastate restriction
does not implicate the right of interstate travel, even if
it is applied intentionally against travelers from other
States, unless it is applied discriminatorily against them.
That would not be the case here, as respondents conceded
at oral argument.
  The other right alleged by respondents to have been
intentionally infringed is the right to abortion.  The
District Court declined to rule on this contention, relying
exclusively upon the right-of-interstate-travel theory; in
our view it also is an inadequate basis for respondents'
1985(3) claim.  Whereas, unlike the right of interstate
travel, the asserted right to abortion was assuredly
-aimed at- by the petitioners, deprivation of that federal
right (whatever its contours) cannot be the object of a
purely private conspiracy.  In Carpenters, we rejected a
claim that an alleged private conspiracy to infringe First
Amendment rights violated 1985(3).  The statute does
not apply, we said, to private conspiracies that are -aimed
at a right that is by definition a right only against state
interference,- but applies only to such conspiracies as are
-aimed at interfering with rights . . . protected against
private, as well as official, encroachment.-  463 U. S., at
833.  There are few such rights (we have hitherto
recognized only the Thirteenth Amendment right to be
free from involuntary servitude, United States v.
Kozminski, 487 U. S. 931, 942 (1988), and, in the same
Thirteenth Amendment context, the right of interstate
travel, see United States v. Guest, supra, at 759, n. 17).
The right to abortion is not among them.  It would be
most peculiar to accord it that preferred position, since it
is much less explicitly protected by the Constitution than,
for example, the right of free speech rejected for such
status in Carpenters.  Moreover, the right to abortion has
been described in our opinions as one element of a more
general right of privacy, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113,
152-153 (1973), or of Fourteenth Amendment liberty, see
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 505
U. S., at ___; and the other elements of those more
general rights are obviously not protected against private
infringement.  (A burglar does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, for example, nor does a mugger violate the
Fourteenth.)  Respondents' 1985(3) -deprivation- claim
must fail, then, because they have identified no right
protected against private action that has been the object
of the alleged conspiracy.
                           II
  Two of the dissenters claim that respondents have
established a violation of the second, -hindrance- clause
of 1985(3), which covers conspiracies -for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any
State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons
within such State or Territory the equal protection of the
laws.-  42 U. S. C. 1985(3).
  This -claim- could hardly be presented in a posture less
suitable for our review.  As respondents frankly admitted
at both argument and reargument, their complaint did
not set forth a claim under the -hindrance- clause.  Tr.
of Oral Arg. 27 (-the complaint did not make a hinder or
prevent claim-); Tr. of Reargument 33-34.  Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, neither the District Court nor the Court
of Appeals considered the application of that clause to the
current facts.  The -hindrance--clause issue is not fairly
included within the questions on which petitioners sought
certiorari, see Pet. for Cert. i; this Court's Rule 14.1(a),
which is alone enough to exclude it from our consider-
ation.  Nor is it true that -[t]he issue was briefed,
albeit sparingly, by the parties prior to the first oral
argument in this case,- post, at 3.  To the contrary,
neither party initiated even the slightest suggestion that
the -hindrance- question was an issue to be argued and
decided here.  That possibility was suggested for the
first time by questions from the bench during argument,
and was reintroduced, again from the bench, during
reargument.  (Respondents sought to include a -hin-
drance--clause section in their Supplemental Brief on
Reargument, but the Court declined to accept that section
for filing.  See 505 U. S. ___ (1992).)  In sum, the
Justices reaching the -hindrance--clause issue in this case
must find in the complaint claims that the respondents
themselves have admitted are not there; must resolve a
question not presented to or ruled on by any lower court;
must revise the rule that it is the Petition for Certiorari
(not the Brief in Opposition and later briefs) that deter-
mines the questions presented; and must penalize the
parties for not addressing an issue on which the Court
specifically denied supplemental briefing.  That is
extraordinary. See, e.g., R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S.
___, ___, n. 3 (1992) (citing cases and treatises); Kamen
v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U. S. ___, ___,
n. 4 (1991); Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U. S. 257, 277, and n. 23 (1989).
  The dissenters' zeal to reach the question whether there
was a -hindrance--clause violation would be more under-
standable, perhaps, if the affirmative answer they
provided were an easy one.  It is far from that.  Judging
from the statutory text, a cause of action under the
-hindrance- clause would seem to require the same -class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus- that the
-deprivation- clause requires, and that we have found
lacking here.  We said in Griffin that the source of the
animus requirement is -[t]he language requiring intent to
deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and
immunities,- 403 U. S., at 102 (emphasis in origi-
nal)-and such language appears in the -hindrance-
clause as well.  At oral argument, respondents conced-
ed applicability of the animus requirement, though they
withdrew this concession on reargument.  Without a race-
or class-based animus requirement, the -hindrance- clause
of this post-Civil War statute would have been an
available weapon against the mass -sit-ins- that were
conducted for purposes of promoting desegregation in the
1960's-a wildly improbable result.
  Even, moreover, if the -hindrance--clause claim did not
fail for lack of class-based animus, it would still fail
unless the -hindrance- clause applies to a private conspir-
acy aimed at rights that are constitutionally protected
only against official (as opposed to private) encroachment.
Justice Stevens finds it -clear- that it does, see post, at
34, citing, surprisingly, Carpenters.  To the extent that
case illuminates this question at all, it is clearly contrary
to the dissent's view, holding that the -deprivation-
clause, at least, does not cover private conspiracies aimed
at rights protected only against state encroachment.
Justice O'Connor simply asserts without analysis that
the -hindrance- clause nonetheless applies to those rights,
post, at 11-12-although the operative language of the
two clauses (-equal protection of the laws-) is identical.
Justice Souter disposes of the rights-guaranteed-against-
private-encroachment requirement, and the class-based
animus requirement as well, only by (1) undertaking a
full-dress reconsideration of Griffin and Carpenters, (2)
concluding that both those cases were wrongly decided,
and (3) limiting the damage of those supposed errors by
embracing an interpretation of the statute that concededly
gives the same language in two successive clauses
completely different meanings.  See post, at 5-16.
This formidable task has been undertaken and completed,
we reiterate, uninvited by party or amicus, and with
respect to a cause of action not presented in the
pleadings, not asserted or ruled upon below, and not
contained in the questions presented on certiorari.
  Equally troubling as the dissenters' questionable
resolution of a legal issue never presented, is their
conclusion that the lower court found (or, in the case of
Justice Souter, can reasonably be thought to have
found) the facts necessary to support the (nonexistent)
-hindrance- claim.  They concede that this requires a
finding that the protesters' purpose was to prevent or
hinder law enforcement officers; but discern such a
finding in the District Court's footnote recitation that -the
rescuers outnumbered the . . . police officers- and that
-the police were unable to prevent the closing of the clinic
for more than six (6) hours.-  National Organization for
Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp., at 1489, n. 4.
See post, at 34 (Stevens, J., dissenting); post, at 12
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); post, at 19 (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).  This renders the distinction between -purpose- and
-effect- utterly meaningless.  Here again, the dissenters
(other than Justice Souter) would give respondents
more than respondents themselves dared to ask.  Respon-
dents frankly admitted at the original argument, and
even at reargument, that the District Court never
concluded that impeding law enforcement was the purpose
of petitioners' protests, and that the -hindrance- claim, if
valid in law, required a remand.  They were obviously
correct.
                           III
  Because respondents were not entitled to relief under
1985(3), they were also not entitled to attorney's fees
and costs under 42 U. S. C. 1988.  We therefore vacate
that award.
  Petitioners seek even more.  They contend that respon-
dents' 1985(3) claims were so insubstantial that the
District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the
action, including the pendent state claims; and that the
injunction should therefore be vacated and the entire
action dismissed.  We do not agree.  While respondents'
1985(3) causes of action fail, they were not, prior to our
deciding of this case, -wholly insubstantial and frivolous,-
Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682-683 (1946), so as to
deprive the District Court of jurisdiction.
  It may be, of course, that even though the District
Court had jurisdiction over the state-law claims, judgment
on those claims alone cannot support the injunction that
was entered.  We leave that question for consideration on
remand.
                         *  *  *
  Justice Stevens' dissent observes that this is -a case
about the exercise of federal power to control an inter-
state conspiracy to commit illegal acts,- post, at 39, and
involves -no ordinary trespass,- or -picketing of a local
retailer,- but -the kind of zealous, politically motivated,
lawless conduct that led to the enactment of the Ku Klux
Act in 1871 and gave it its name,- post, at 7.  Those are
certainly evocative assertions, but as far as the point of
law we have been asked to decide is concerned, they are
irrelevant.  We construe the statute, not the views of
-most members of the citizenry.-  Post, at 39.  By its
terms, 1985(3) covers concerted action by as few as two
persons, and does not require even interstate (much less
nationwide) scope.  It applies no more and no less to
completely local action by two part-time protesters than
to nationwide action by a full-time force of thousands.
And under our precedents it simply does not apply to the
sort of action at issue here.
  Trespassing upon private property is unlawful in all
States, as is, in many States and localities, intentionally
obstructing the entrance to private premises.  These
offenses may be prosecuted criminally under state law,
and may also be the basis for state civil damages.  They
do not, however, give rise to a federal cause of action
simply because their objective is to prevent the perfor-
mance of abortions, any more than they do so (as we
have held) when their objective is to stifle free speech.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part and vacated in part, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                      It is so ordered.